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MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT—OR NOT: 
APPELLATE JUDGES’ PREFERENCES AND
PET PEEVES ABOUT ORAL ARGUMENT
Margaret D. McGaughey* 
There was a time when the only way to plead a case was 
orally. King Solomon decided between two women claiming to 
be the mother of the same baby based only on their oral 
representations, made without briefs (and, for that matter, 
without lawyers).1 In the early 1800s, cases in the United States 
Supreme Court required no briefs, and oral arguments 
occasionally lasted as long as ten days.2 By the twenty-first 
century, only one fifth of cases in the federal courts of appeals 
are decided on the basis of both briefs and oral argument.3 The 
rest are resolved on the pleadings alone. Even those appeals that 
are heard orally are given only thirty minutes per side in the 
*The former Appellate Chief of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Maine, Ms. McGaughey argued 450 appeals before the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit.
1. 1 Kings 3:16–28 (Revised Standard).
2. John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 ABA J. 895, 895 (1940).
3. Jay Tidmarsh, The Future of Oral Argument, 48 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 475, 478 n.16 
(2016).
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Supreme Court4 and fifteen per side, or even less, in the federal 
courts of appeals and state supreme courts.5
With so little time to make their case, but so much at stake, 
what should lawyers do during oral argument to capture the 
judges’ attention?
Lawyers have frequently written on this topic. Helpful to 
fellow advocates as such works may be, what matters is less 
what lawyers think about oral argument than what resonates 
with judges.
This article is the product of in-person interviews with 
nineteen state and federal appellate judges to ascertain what they 
find to be effective at oral argument and what they deem 
counter-productive or even annoying.6 Ten of the interviewed 
jurists are active or senior members of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit.7 Eight are current or former 
justices of the highest courts of Maine,8 Massachusetts9, New 
Hampshire,10 and Rhode Island.11 One jurist was formerly Chief 
4. Sup. Ct. R. 28.3 (July 1, 2019) (providing that “[u]nless the Court directs otherwise, 
each side is allowed one-half hour for argument”).
5. See, e.g., 1st Cir. Loc. R. 34(c) (providing that “[n]ormally the court will permit no 
more than 15 minutes per side for oral argument”); Me. R. App. P. 11(b) (providing that 
“[e]ach side will be allowed up to 15 minutes for argument” in the Supreme Judicial 
Court).
6. Former First Circuit Chief Judge Frank M. Coffin’s classic guide to oral advocacy 
prompted many of the questions posed during the interviews and added much to the 
discussion in each. See FRANK M. COFFIN, A LEXICON OF ORAL ADVOCACY (Nat’l Inst.
for Trial Advocacy (1984)). In the interest of disclosure: this author served as Judge 
Coffin’s law clerk.
7. Sincere thanks go to Chief Judge Jeffrey R. Howard and Judges David J. Barron, 
Michael Boudin (Chief Judge from 2001 to 2008), Kermit V. Lipez, Sandra L. Lynch
(Chief Judge from 2008 to 2015), William J. Kayatta, Jr., Bruce M. Selya, Norman H. 
Stahl, O. Rogeriee Thompson, and Juan R. Torruella.
8. The author is grateful to three former members of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine: Chief Justice Leigh I. Saufley, Associate Justice Donald G. Alexander, and Chief 
Justice Daniel E. Wathen.
9. Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants, Associate Justice David A. Lowy, and Associate 
Justice Scott L. Kafker, who previously sat on the Massachusetts Appeals Court, graciously 
consented to interviews. Andrea Breier, the law clerk to Justices Kafker and Lowy, was 
also helpful in explaining that court’s practices.
10. Recently retired Chief Justice Robert J. Lynn of the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
made significant contributions to this dialogue.
11. Chief Justice Paul Suttell kindly agreed to add his thoughts.
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Judge of the First Circuit and now is an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court.12
With respect to some aspects of oral argument, the judges 
were in complete accord. Regarding others, there were 
significant differences of opinion. The objective of this article is 
to identify the points of agreement and disagreement so that oral 
advocates can avoid what judges see as common pitfalls and be 
aware of differences from court to court and judge to judge that 
will inform their oral advocacy.
I. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
The judges all agreed that the most important part of the 
appellate process is not oral argument, but the briefs. On paper, 
lawyers can carefully shape their legal theories, chose their 
words precisely, incorporate accurate supporting record 
references, edit and revise repeatedly, and bring the insights of 
colleagues to bear on the final product. Oral arguments, by 
contrast, are one-person shows, more spontaneous, occasionally 
unpredictable, and often lacking the careful scripting that attends 
the briefs.
There was no unanimity among the judges, however, 
regarding the significance, or even the utility of oral argument.
The cost to litigants can be significant, for oral argument often 
entails travel, not to mention the legal fees associated with 
preparing for and appearing in the appellate court. There is also 
a cost to judges, who must spend their own and their law clerks’ 
time getting ready for and hearing argument when they could be 
writing opinions instead.
Whether oral argument should be ordered less frequently 
was the subject of much debate among the judges. First Circuit 
Judge Torruella suggests that oral argument is a carryover from 
the English legal system, where briefs are literally brief, but oral 
12. Having sat on both the First Circuit and the Supreme Court, Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer contributed a unique perspective.
The reader should note that this article refers to each judge or justice by the title 
appropriate to his or her highest judicial office. Thus, although some of Justice Breyer’s 
comments refer to his experience on the First Circuit, he appears throughout as “Justice 
Breyer,” Dean Saufley of the University of Maine School of Law appears throughout as 
“Chief Justice Saufley,” and so on.
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argument can last hours or even days. Many judges share his 
view that too many cases are set for argument, and the few truly 
complex appeals where oral argument will assist in the 
decisionmaking process are given too little time. Other judges, 
however, favor granting oral argument liberally because even if 
the outcome of a case appears clear, it can be difficult to predict 
what will arise during argument.
First Circuit Chief Judge Howard has come to believe that 
because his is a “paper court” and its members are very well 
prepared, “the federal circuit courts could get by without oral 
argument, but I think we would make a lot of mistakes.” He 
finds educational value in having judges face the lawyers who 
have thought about the cases longer than the judges have and are 
willing to probe the limits of a possible ruling and what its 
impact would be. Whereas when he came to the First Circuit in 
2002, forty percent of cases were set for argument, after a short-
term increase in criminal filings, the number has settled at thirty-
five percent. One concern Chief Judge Howard has about the 
declining number of oral arguments is institutional: that there 
are fewer opportunities for lawyers to appear before appellate 
courts and gain the experience needed to improve their 
advocacy. He favors adding a case or two to each argument list 
simply to allow lawyers—particularly young lawyers—to 
develop their skills.
The consensus of the judges was that although oral 
argument changes the outcome of an appeal only between ten 
and twenty percent of the time, it alters the reasoning more 
frequently. For Justice Breyer, for example, oral argument at the 
Supreme Court changes the result five percent of the time, but 
can refocus the reasoning in thirty percent of cases. Oral 
argument can shed light on issues that have been inadequately 
addressed in the briefing, for example procedural bars or 
mootness. Maine Chief Justice Saufley’s view is that a good 
advocate whose brief has not quite captured the court’s attention 
can bring the case to life at oral argument. First Circuit Judge 
Lipez tells students—and by extension lawyers—that they 
should always assume that oral argument will make a difference 
because “often enough, it does.”
Even the non-believers conceded that oral argument serves 
a public function. Judging is a relatively solitary pursuit, and 
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what judges do can appear to the general public to be largely a 
mystery. Courts issue opinions that have significant impact not 
only on individuals, but on the nation as a whole, yet how they 
arrive at those opinions seems almost clandestine. In addition, 
the media does not always accurately portray the courts. In all 
but the most sensitive cases, however, oral argument is open to 
the public and this allows citizens a window into the appellate 
process and the judges’ thinking. It also gives the litigants and 
their lawyers the sense that their arguments have been 
considered and they have literally had their day in court.
Judges offered varying insights into what, apart from 
winning, an advocate’s purpose at oral argument should be.
Everyone agreed that a principal function is to answer questions 
and thereby educate the court. First Circuit Judge Lynch 
summarizes the view of a number of jurists that an exceptional 
advocate will deliver an oral argument that amounts to an 
outline of how an opinion in that lawyer’s favor would read.
According to First Circuit Judge Boudin, lawyers should never 
present the extreme version of their position, but should guide 
judges to a result that will appear to both the court and the 
general public to be reasonable and legitimate. New 
Hampshire’s Chief Justice Lynn describes an advocate’s 
objective as persuading the court not only that a given position 
is correct, but also that it will lead to a proper development of 
the law and will not produce an outlier that the court will have to 
deal with in the future. Many appellate judges, five of the seven 
justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) 
among them, have previously sat on the trial bench, which 
makes them especially attentive to giving trial judges clear 
guidance. Those judges’ trial experience makes them want to 
explore at oral argument the breadth of an opinion and any 
caveats that should be attached.
For some judges, oral argument is an opportunity to learn 
their colleagues’ perspectives on a case. As a matter of court 
culture, many judges do not confer with their colleagues in 
advance of oral argument. A thorough discussion among the 
judges comes only in the semble, the conference of judges,
which in most courts is held immediately after a day’s argument 
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session is completed.13 Questions to the lawyer during oral 
argument may thus be for the purpose of teasing out another 
judge’s leanings or using the lawyer’s answers as the basis for 
the semble discussion. Communicating with other jurists 
through questions to the lawyers is especially common at the 
Supreme Court, where, by virtue of having voted to grant or 
deny certiorari, the Justices are already aware of their
colleagues’ tentative views. The same is true of en banc
hearings in the federal courts of appeals, where a majority of 
judges in active service who are not otherwise disqualified will 
have voted to hear the case.14
Although different jurists put it different ways, they all 




answering the question when it is asked.
II. PREPARATION
There was no dispute among the judges that the best oral 
advocates know their cases better than anyone else in the world.
That includes opposing counsel and the judges themselves. In 
the state courts, it is typical for judges to hear twenty to twenty-
four appeals in a one-month term. Panels of the First Circuit
generally hear twenty-four cases per month, or more when there 
is a two-week session. In the Supreme Court, up to twenty-four
cases can be heard in each of the two-week terms held between 
October and June. The sheer number of cases means that a well-
prepared advocate can be of considerable assistance to any 
appellate court.
13. During semble, the judges cast tentative votes to affirm, reverse, or order some 
other relief. Except for jurisdictions where the author of an opinion is selected in advance, 
writing assignments are generally given at semble.
14. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
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A. Judges’ Preparation
Because judges have differing methods of preparing for 
argument, a lawyer expecting to appear in an unfamiliar court 
may want to research the backgrounds and opinions of the jurists 
who will decide their case. It may also be useful to contact 
experienced advocates in that jurisdiction or former law clerks 
to gain insight into how the judges ready themselves for 
argument.15 Although the composition of a bench should not 
matter to the outcome of an appeal, the reality is that it often 
does. The more a lawyer knows about judges’ predilections and 
how they prepare, the better equipped the lawyer will be to 
answer questions or correct misunderstandings.
1. The First Circuit
The First Circuit sits in three-member panels, with two 
panels occasionally sitting on the same day. Because the 
composition of panels generally changes, not all members of the 
First Circuit hear all cases that are scheduled for that session.
Each panel typically hears six cases a day over four days, sitting 
for one or two weeks each month.16
Briefing can be complete a month to six weeks before oral 
argument is scheduled. The members of the panels generally 
have time to read the briefs and lower court opinion, examine 
critical parts of the record, order exhibits from the trial court if 
necessary, and, for those who use law clerks before argument, 
direct the preparation of bench memos. Many federal appellate 
judges discuss the cases they will hear not only with the clerk 
who writes the bench memo, but with all of their clerks as a 
group. The clerks debate the merits of the cases and often 
develop questions for the judge to put to counsel at argument.
This reliance on law clerks should serve as a warning to the 
unwary. It is law clerks’ unarticulated job description to find 
facts in the record that the advocates have overlooked, relevant 
cases that have not been cited, or precedent that has been 
mischaracterized, contorted, or discredited.
15. While an active practitioner in the First Circuit, this author fielded such inquiries.
16. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, RULEBOOK 118 (Jan. 
13, 2020) (outlining schedule for sessions and their locations in I.O.P. VII(C)).
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Justice Breyer reports that when he sat on the First Circuit, 
the issues could generally be resolved by established precedents, 
which enabled him to “skate” through the briefs. He contrasted 
his experience on the First Circuit, where the focus is on the 
case, with the Supreme Court, where the emphasis is on the 
issue. A major function of intermediate appellate courts is error 
correction, which makes procedural bars important. At the 
Supreme Court, however, the certiorari process seeks to 
eliminate any case in which such an obstacle will prevent the 
Justices from deciding an issue cleanly.
2. The Supreme Court
Justice Breyer’s means of preparing for argument in the 
Supreme Court is more akin to his former colleagues’ 
approaches in the First Circuit. He receives the briefs several 
weeks in advance of an argument session. In any given case 
there can be eight to fifteen briefs—for the parties, the Solicitor 
General, and any amici, plus reply briefs—and sometimes as 
many as eighty (which he remembers in a right-to-die case) or a
hundred (in an affirmative action case).
Whereas his clerks read the certiorari petitions and write 
memoranda, Justice Breyer reads all the briefs personally. He 
starts with the opinion below because if there is a claim of error 
in the legal reasoning, he feels “at sea” unless he knows what 
that reasoning is. Among the briefs, he may begin with the 
Solicitor General’s, if there is one. He tends to read a 
petitioner’s reply brief before the principal brief because the 
reply “makes the same argument and it’s in twenty-five pages,” 
not the forty to sixty pages of a principal brief. He puts the 
amicus briefs in order of who he thinks are the better lawyers, 
and reads those briefs according to his ranking. When the 
amicus briefs begin to be repetitive, he may skim the tables of 
contents to see if they raise any new points. He can become 
interested in a particular set of amicus briefs if those 
representing the same types of clients take opposite positions—
for example, one nursing association favoring a constitutional 
right to die and another opposing it. It takes him an entire day to 
read two sets of briefs. Justice Breyer then talks to his four law 
clerks, dividing that session’s cases among them. After reading 
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the assigned clerk’s bench memo, he discusses the cases with 
the clerks as a group once, or sometimes twice, before argument.
3. State Supreme Courts
State court appellate judges have different ways of 
preparing. They generally have less time to grapple with a 
greater number of cases, and also fewer law clerks. This means 
that advocates should be alert to any possible misapprehensions 
regarding the facts or the record. Indeed, some justices use their 
law clerks only to research discrete issues.
a. Maine
In the Maine SJC, the initial assignment for drafting an 
opinion is made in advance of oral argument. The assigned 
justice’s law clerk prepares a bench memo that is circulated 
among the other members of the court. Because the entire record 
is now available to all seven justices through a Google drive, 
analysis by the law clerk writing the bench memo focuses on the 
legal arguments. Although lawyers think they are able to tell at a 
Law Court17 argument who will be the author of an opinion 
because of the number and detail of the questions that justice 
asks, this perception can be deceiving.  As Justice Alexander 
points out, the assigned justice’s law-clerk bench memo and 
well written briefs often spark the other justices’ interest in an 
issue.
b. Massachusetts
The seven justices of the Massachusetts SJC receive briefs 
one month before oral argument.18 Because of the press of 
producing opinions on the previous month’s cases, however,
many justices are able to turn to the new set of briefs only at the 
end of the week in which they have conferenced about opinions.
17. When sitting as an appellate court, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court is known as the 
Law Court. Supreme Court, ST. OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.courts.maine.gov/
maine_courts/supreme/index.shtml (“The Supreme Judicial Court is the governing body of 
the Judicial Branch. Sitting as the Law Court, it is the court of final appeal.”).
18. Massachusetts is the only northern New England state to have a two-tiered system 
of appellate review.
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This may mean having only two or three working days to 
prepare for the next set of arguments.
The justices read the briefs themselves, and occasionally 
also read parts of the record and salient cases. The writer of an 
SJC opinion is not assigned in advance. One justice, however, is 
chosen to be the “reciting judge” and can be expected to go into 
greater depth with respect to the record and the caselaw, and 
tends to lead the discussion at semble.
c. New Hampshire
In New Hampshire’s five-member Supreme Court, the 
writer of an opinion is assigned randomly, generally a month in 
advance of argument. Some, but not all, justices tend to focus 
more extensively on the cases they are assigned to write. The 
justices generally prepare cases alone; only one of them uses
bench memos frequently. Before argument, law clerks may 
perform spot research. It is after argument, at the opinion-
writing stage, that the law clerks become more involved.
d. Rhode Island
Rhode Island’s five Supreme Court justices hear appeals 
that fall into two categories. Show-cause cases, which have been 
filtered for review, must be heard by at least three justices, 
although in practice, the full court hears them unless one justice 
is recused.19 The lawyers in show-cause cases are entitled to ten
minutes per side at oral argument with two minutes for 
rebuttal.20 In contrast, the lawyers in full cases can expect to be 
allotted thirty minutes per side with ten minutes for rebuttal.21
Briefs are filed approximately thirty days before argument. As 
soon as one set of oral arguments finishes, the justices begin 
work on the next month’s cases. Law clerks in Rhode Island 
write bench memos only for their own justice.
19. Criminal cases must be heard by the full court. R.I. SUP. CT. R. 12A.
20. R.I. SUP. CT. R. 24.
21. Id.
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B. Lawyers’ Preparation
1. Who Should Argue
One issue that sparked considerable discussion among the 
jurists is who should handle the appeal: the trial lawyer or an 
appellate specialist. A trial attorney has lived with the case from 
beginning to end. First Circuit Judge Kayatta points out that, 
especially as pertains to error correction, the trial lawyer may be 
able to make the appellate court “feel the hit” in a way new 
counsel cannot. However, trial lawyers may be less sensitive to 
procedural bars or less well-versed in the standards of review 
that often determine the outcome of an appeal. Trial counsel 
may also be tempted to treat the appellate court like a jury and 
make the mistake of giving impassioned pleas about the equities 
rather than measured answers to questions about the law or 
record. This was a common complaint among the judges. When 
the trial lawyer’s own conduct is in question—for example, 
when the lawyer failed to object at trial—there can also be 
awkwardness for that lawyer at oral argument.
Some judges, Rhode Island’s Chief Justice Suttell among 
them, see value simply in having a new pair of eyes view the 
record and precedents. However, a lawyer who did not handle 
the trial may be tempted to dodge a difficult question by saying 
“I was not trial counsel.” This response was one of the highest 
on the judges’ list of pet peeves. First Circuit Judge Stahl and 
Chief Justice Gants of the Massachusetts SJC warn that there is 
also a danger associated with senior partners stepping in at the 
last minute to argue orally. Even though the client may want the 
named partner to argue, an associate who has read the record, 
written the brief, and perhaps even tried the case may be better 
equipped to answer questions from the bench.
In the Supreme Court, the increasing trend is for a small 
cadre of specialists—most of them in Washington, D.C.—to 
handle the cases. An advantage of these specialists is that they 
have become accustomed to what in the federal courts of appeals 
would amount to an en banc hearing every day. In the Supreme 
Court, there are nine individualistic personalities who, as Justice 
Breyer puts it, cannot even agree where to go to lunch. Supreme 
Court specialists also are mindful that the emphasis in the Court 
is not on the case, but on the issue. A difficulty for the bar in 
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general is that the increasing specialization at the Supreme Court 
level means that fewer lawyers acquire the experience needed to 
maximize their effectiveness in that court. Not every client 
whose case reaches the Supreme Court, however, wants to 
abandon counsel who has represented them ably up to that point.
Moreover, in cases that are extremely technical in nature—tax or 
bankruptcy cases, for example—the best advocate may be a 
lawyer who is familiar with that specialty.
The consensus of the judges was that lawyers who 
regularly appear in appellate courts generally make better oral 
advocates. Lawyers who work for institutions—the United 
States or a public defender agency—tend to be effective, in part 
because those organizations have internal training, review, and 
moot court processes. In Judge Lynch’s view, lawyers for
institutional clients may also have a better eye for balancing the 
long-range impact of a decision against the outcome of the 
individual case. The principal concern judges have with 
choosing between trial counsel or an appellate specialist is that 
the advocate be able, as First Circuit Judge Barron puts it, to 
“speak the language of appellate law.” By that they mean, for 
example, that lawyers understand and apply established 
standards of review instead of ignoring them or wasting time 
urging the judges to change them.
2. What to Prepare
A common theme of the judges was that good preparation 
means knowing the case better than the judges do. Preparation 
requires mastery of the record22—having read it personally from 
cover to cover—and the ability to answer any question about, 
for example, whether there was an objection at trial and what its 
basis was. Questions of law may be readily handled in the briefs, 
but at oral argument, the record—and a lawyer’s grasp of it—
are critical. An oral advocate must be able to correct any 
misunderstanding about a record fact, whether by opposing 
22. Parties do not always agree on the contents of the record appendix. In jurisdictions 
that have electronic filing, experienced counsel for the appellee will review the docket and 
supplement the appendix with any documents or transcripts the appellant may not have 
included that the appellee deems necessary.
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counsel or one of the judges. Ideally, this is done by being able 
to cite a record reference.
Preparation also means understanding the standards of 
review and being fully familiar with the significant authorities—
including the authors of those opinions, whom counsel may be 
addressing at oral argument. It is important to know which cited 
cases have been discredited, questioned, or targeted for Supreme 
Court review. Case research should thus be updated to and 
including the day of argument. Judge Stahl warns that lawyers 
should never allow themselves to become flummoxed by being 
asked about a dispositive case that was decided after the briefs 
were filed.
According to Chief Judge Howard, in criminal cases 
especially, it is important to be fully conversant with the facts.
They can make the difference between a search and seizure that 
is reasonable and one that is not. Judge Barron’s view is that 
where a statute, regulation or case precedent is in issue, the 
advocate should be able to quote the operative language during 
oral argument and direct the judges in how to read it.
Whether the bench that will hear argument has had weeks 
to prepare or only days, the judges uniformly agreed that oral 
argument should never be simply a second presentation of the 
briefs. Instead, the advocate should view the case through the 
different prism of how the judges or any other objective 
observer would see it. Some judges believe that oral advocates 
should lead with their strongest argument. The same is true of an 
argument that is difficult, but could be dispositive.
Massachusetts Justice Lowy points out that, especially when 
faced with a “hot bench,” if a lawyer does not begin with a 
winning or potentially dispositive argument, the time constraints 
of oral argument and questions from the judges may make it 
impossible ever to reach that claim. Maine’s Chief Justice 
Wathen notes that in multiple-issue cases, there is generally a 
“jugular, make-or-break argument” and good lawyers will focus 
initially on that argument.
According to Justice Breyer, however, because “you are no 
stronger than your weakest point,” experienced advocates will 
be able to segue quickly to their weaknesses. One means of 
achieving this result is by presenting the affirmative case, 
acknowledging that some aspect of it may be problematic, and 
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then addressing the problem. The judges made clear they 
appreciate lawyers who candidly recognize the flaws in their 
cases and avoid even the appearance of trying to hide anything.
Whether handled from the outset, or in response to questions 
from the bench, having ready answers to weaknesses in a case is 
one of the most important aspects of preparation. Justice Breyer 
pointed out that Chief Justice Roberts was known as a 
practitioner to make a written list of all the difficult questions he 
anticipated, rank the answers, and then all but memorize the list.
Good preparation often means being able to offer multiple 
reasons for reaching the result the advocate wants. Chief Justice 
Wathen deems this the “belt and suspenders” approach. As 
Judge Coffin explains, the “even if” technique runs along the 
lines of “Even if there is appellate jurisdiction and even if the 
objection was preserved below and even if the trial judge erred 
in his ruling, nevertheless the error was harmless because ____, 
____, and ____.”23 Although perhaps best laid out in detail in 
the briefs, this technique can protect a lawyer from becoming 
cornered during oral argument. If, for example, the judges 
appear unpersuaded by a procedural challenge, the advocate can 
quickly shift to the merits or from there to a claim of harmless 
error.
Most of the judges favored a lawyer—whether for the 
appellant or the appellee—whose remarks begin by identifying 
what issues have been raised and then explaining which one or 
two issues will be the focus of the presentation. Because 
argument time is short, this approach signals to the judges that 
the lawyer is not ignoring any of the issues, but is concentrating 
on what appears likely to be of greatest interest to the bench or 
most significant to the outcome. Identifying from the outset a 
lawyer’s view of what is central helps to orient the judges. It 
also gives, in effect, a roadmap to the argument that allows the 
judges to redirect the advocate to another issue that the judges 
may consider more important. Oral advocates given this hint 
should seize it and pivot immediately to the issue the court has 
identified. An introduction that identifies what issues will be 
covered also encourages the court to remind the advocate as 
23. COFFIN, supra note 6, at 79.
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time is expiring that the moment has come for addressing any 
other issues listed at the start.
As an aside, several judges complained that lawyers tend to 
raise too many issues on appeal in the idle hope that one of them 
will be meritorious. Judge Boudin holds law schools partly 
responsible for this penchant. In law school, students are graded 
on their ability to identify every possible argument, including 
the most extreme ones. Good advocates, however, know to focus 
only on a few meaty issues. Justice Alexander’s view is that 
raising too many issues diverts the court’s attention and can 
suggest a lack of credibility or judgment on the lawyer’s part. A
case with a large number of issues can also be frustrating for 
courts, such as the Massachusetts SJC, that publish all of their 
opinions. This is because even though some issues may be 
clearly frivolous, the judges must still spend time and effort 
addressing them. Especially at oral argument, lawyers should 
emphasize only the arguments that are critical to a successful 
outcome.
The judges also consistently advised against preparing an 
argument that begins with a lengthy summary of the facts or 
procedural history of the case. The judges found this to be a 
surprisingly common mistake, especially on the part of young 
lawyers. A lengthy introduction can irritate judges by suggesting 
that they are not prepared and it is almost always a waste of 
precious argument time. What experienced lawyers do instead is 
plunge immediately into the issues. Of course, if a judge seems 
confused or asks about the facts or procedure, the lawyer should 
explain. Otherwise, however, the judges agreed that counsel 
should presume that the court is conversant with the case. If a 
lawyer is unsure, one approach First Circuit Judge Thompson 
recommends is to begin with something along the lines of “I 
assume the court is familiar with the facts.”
3. Procedural Bars
One frequently overlooked issue that counsel should 
always anticipate is possible procedural bars that will heighten 
the standard of review. These include a failure to object at trial; 
offering the trial court one theory, but advancing another theory 
on appeal; adverting to an issue on appeal, but not developing it 
adequately; or raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief 
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or at oral argument. The judges had different reactions to how 
strictly procedural bars should be enforced.
Some judges believe that appellate courts invoke 
procedural bars too frequently and may use them to duck thorny 
issues. Other judges see the failure to preserve an objection at 
trial as a sign of sloppy lawyering or occasionally an effort on 
the part of a cagey lawyer to sandbag a trial judge by failing to 
object, all the while hoping that the plain error rule will save the 
day.24 What may present the greatest difficulty for Judge Barron 
is when a novel or complex argument is raised in a brief, but just 
barely—in a sentence or two. The concern is in part fairness to 
the trial judge, who may view it as unreasonable to be reversed 
on a ground that the judge was never asked to consider. There is 
also the question of fairness to the opposing party, who may not 
grasp the import of a claim that is buried in the briefs. Perhaps 
most significant to Judge Barron is that the appellate court needs 
the benefit of full advocacy before deciding important issues.
Most appellate courts have a discretionary right to overlook 
forfeitures and waivers to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Judges 
may thus choose to entertain issues for the first time during oral 
argument or even raise sua sponte issues that have not been 
briefed or argued at all. Because some courts—and some judges 
on those courts—are especially unforgiving with respect to 
forfeitures and waivers, however, lawyers should research in 
advance the proclivities of that court. Even more important, 
lawyers should not wait for the court to raise a procedural bar, 
but should address any such issue directly, both in the briefs and 
at argument.
4. Crutches
In an ideal world, lawyers would be well enough prepared 
to be able to argue with no notes. After all, actors can speak 
from memory sometimes for hours. For most lawyers, however, 
preparing for oral argument means taking some form of crutch 
to the podium to enable the advocate, for example, to quote the 
24. United States v. Olano, 507 US. 725 (1993) allows courts to consider an 
unpreserved claim when there is (1) error; (2) that is plain or obvious; and (3) affects 
substantial rights; and (4) if, absent reversal, a miscarriage of justice would result or the 
integrity of the judicial system would be undermined. Id. at 732–36
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precise language of a complex statute or regulation. The judges 
appear not to care especially—or in some cases even notice—
whether lawyers bring to the podium black notebooks (as is 
advised in the Supreme Court),25 legal pads, iPads, notecards, or 
scraps of paper.26 As First Circuit Judge Selya joked, a lawyer 
“could bring six generations of his family to the podium.”
The universal concern is that whatever material the lawyer 
takes to the lectern should not be so voluminous as to interfere 
with the presentation and should be well-enough organized that 
the lawyer can refer to it easily, quickly, and without wasting 
time. A lawyer who thumbs through briefs and appendices in the 
middle of an argument can appear to be fumbling or to have 
become sidetracked. The sound of paper rustling against the 
microphone can also be distracting to the judges.
In the Supreme Court, reliance on a legal pad is actively 
discouraged.27 One problem with iPads, which Massachusetts 
Justice Kafker identified, is that the advocate may be tempted to 
focus on the tablet, lose eye contact with the judges, and even 
stop listening. If a lawyer anticipates needing computer access to 
the record or cases during argument, Justice Kafker suggests 
having an associate at counsel table who has a tablet, can find 
the necessary information, and can pass a note to the arguing 
lawyer without interrupting the flow of the dialogue.
Even experienced lawyers tend to take a few notes to the 
lectern, although in practice they rarely even glance at them.
Notes at the podium can provide a measure of comfort against 
nerves. Having something small in hand can also guard against 
excessive gesticulating.
Many judges notice when lawyers bring nothing to the 
podium, although some find that practice to be purely a matter 
25. CLERK OF THE COURT, GUIDE FOR COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (Oct. 3, 2019), available at https://www
.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guide%20for%20Counsel%202019_rev10_3_19.pdf.
26. This appellate advocate’s crutch of choice was five-inch by seven-inch notecards—
one or two cards per issue—which could be re-ordered while the argument was taking 
place to accommodate the direction of the discussion. The name of a judge who made a 
helpful point with opposing counsel could be noted on the cards so that point could be 
reinforced during the appellee’s arguments. The judges say they generally are not averse to 
an argument that refers to a judge’s remarks to either counsel.
27. “Please note that a legal sized pad does not fit on the lectern properly. Turning 
pages in a notebook appears more professional than flipping pages of a legal pad.” GUIDE 
FOR COUNSEL, supra note 25, at 6. 
158 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
of the lawyer’s personal pride. Arguing without notes can be 
impressive because, as Judge Kayatta points out, it creates a 
professional appearance and suggests that the advocate has total 
command of the law, facts, and record. Arguing without notes
does not impress the judges, however, if the argument is not 
buttressed by adequate knowledge of the case. Judges would 
prefer to hear a good argument delivered with notes than a bad 
argument presented note-free. The takeaway is that lawyers 
should bring to the podium as little as possible, while being sure
that they have what they need.
Of greater importance to the jurists than what type of crutch 
a lawyer uses is that the advocate not be tied to it. In courts that 
exempt the first few minutes of argument from questions,28 it 
may be more acceptable to adhere closely to a prepared script at 
first. Even then, however, the remarks should be well-enough 
rehearsed that the advocate does not read them.29 Although 
some judges are prepared to accept following a written text as 
the product of nerves, it causes the lawyer to lose eye contact 
with the bench and severely limits the ability to engage in 
dialogue. Reading an argument can also cause judges to lose
interest because they generally have read the briefs and do not 
need them to be reiterated aloud. The judges agreed that 
excessive reading by counsel for the appellee is especially 
ineffective because what that lawyer should do instead is seize 
on what the court has said to the appellant. In sum, although 
crutches may be helpful, or even necessary, they should not 
become a ball and chain.
28. In New Hampshire and Maine, court custom dictates that appellate judges will not 
interrupt lawyers for the first three minutes of argument. That practice was also recently 
adopted in the Supreme Court of the United States. GUIDE FOR COUNSEL, supra note 25, at 
7 (“The Court generally will not question lead counsel for petitioners (or appellants) and 
respondents (or appellees) during the first two minutes of argument. The white light on the 
lectern will illuminate briefly at the end of this period to signal the start of questioning.”)
29. Excessive reading is indeed discouraged by both the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and the Supreme Court Rules. Fed. R. App. P 34(c) (“Counsel must not read at 
length from briefs, records, or authorities.”); Sup. Ct. R. 28.1 (“Oral argument read from a 
prepared text is not favored.”).
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5. Moot Courts
One way of ferreting out the strengths and weaknesses of 
an advocate’s position is by holding moot courts. Department of 
Justice policy requires moot courts in any appeal in which the 
United States is the appellant and strongly encourages them in 
any case involving the United States that presents a novel or 
complex issue. Holding moot courts is also a frequent practice in 
the offices of many state attorneys general and public defenders.
For younger lawyers, a mock oral argument at which more 
experienced lawyers act as judges is good practice because it 
gives the novice a chance to receive constructive criticism about 
reacting under fire. More experienced advocates tend to prepare 
not by holding dress rehearsals, but by discussing with their 
colleagues the questions they are likely to be asked and answers 
they might give. Justice Breyer offers this suggestion: “Know 
your case and explain it to your spouse, teenaged daughter, 
somebody prepared to listen. When they understand it, you’ve 
got it.”
III. LISTENING
Perhaps the most common complaint the judges have about 
under-performing lawyers is that they become so engrossed in 
their prepared remarks that they fail to listen: they do not listen 
to the questions put to opposing counsel; they do not listen to 
opposing counsel’s answers; and they sometimes do not even 
listen to the questions put to them while they are at the podium.
Listening to what the judges ask opposing counsel is critical 
because those questions may spark the interest of other judges or 
provide information that can be used in response or rebuttal to 
stress key points. Listening to opposing counsel’s answers is 
equally important because those answers may raise significant 
issues or amount to concessions that can also be emphasized in 
response or rebuttal.  Listening to judges when being questioned 
at the podium is essential because lawyers who do not listen can 
wind up answering questions the judges never asked.
Justice Breyer warns against this bad habit of failing to 
listen. “You’re not there to prove to some person how clever you 
are,” he says. “You’re there to win the case. So listen to what the 
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other side is saying.” He recalled having been given similar 
advice when preparing for his Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings: “You’re not in a confirmation hearing to show you’re 
clever. You’re in a confirmation to get confirmed. The way you 
will get confirmed is to listen to the question. Think about it.
Then take your time and answer—fully.”
The judges agreed that counsel for the appellee has a 
tremendous advantage at oral argument. First, the burden is on 
the appellant, not the appellee. A second advantage is that the 
appellee argues after the appellant and thus has the opportunity 
to hear the judges’ questions to opposing counsel and that 
lawyer’s responses. Counsel who listens to that exchange can 
adapt the appellee’s argument on the spot to correct mistakes, 
seize upon concessions, and hammer home whatever points the 
bench has made that the opponent left unanswered. The judges 
noted that experienced counsel for appellees will generally put 
aside their prepared remarks, focus initially on the issues that 
have dominated the discussion with the appellant, and then turn 
to the issues they believe should be addressed. Judge Barron’s 
view is that unless the dialogue between the judges and 
opposing counsel is completely off track, picking up where the 
court left off is generally effective, among other reasons because 
it demonstrates to the court that the lawyer has been paying 
attention.
Listening is also key because it tells the advocate when to 
stop talking. Inexperienced lawyers sometimes think that 
because they have been given fifteen minutes to argue, they 
should use every second of that time. In the judges’ estimation, 
however, a good lawyer will take the court’s pulse, assess when 
all of the necessary ground has been covered, and end before the 
red light begins to flash. If the judges have additional questions, 
they will not be shy about asking them. Judges may even 
encourage a lawyer to end before time has run by thanking the 
lawyer, as was Chief Justice Saufley’s practice. Good lawyers 
take the hint. Occasionally, counsel for an appellee will 
recognize that the best course is to waive argument altogether.
Chief Justice Wathen quotes his predecessor Vincent 
McKusick’s saying: “God bless the man who has nothing to say 
and knows enough to say it.”
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Judge Boudin reinforces the point with a story about his 
colleague Judge Selya as a practitioner. Representing the 
appellee, Judge Selya appeared before a panel of the First 
Circuit that included Judge Bailey Aldrich. In person, Judge 
Aldrich could be “so sweet and charming,” but on the bench, he 
was “noticeably stern with lawyers.” During the argument, 
Judge Aldrich looked at then-advocate Selya, who was seated at 
counsel table, and barked, “Wipe that smirk off your face.
You’re next.” Counsel for the appellant promptly ended his 
argument. Judge Selya then “rose from his chair, walked to the 
podium . . . put his arms on the edge and said, ‘Judge Aldrich, I 
think that everything that needs to have been said in this case 
has been said’ and sat down.” In Judge Boudin’s view, this was 
“true genius.”
Justice Breyer tells a similar story about Justice Clarence 
Thomas. After one lawyer argued, his opponent rose, said, “I 
don’t think I have anything to add, Your Honor,” and returned to 
his seat. Justice Thomas reportedly commented, “I have heard 
many arguments, but I think that’s the only time I’ve heard the 
perfect argument.”
IV. ANSWERING QUESTIONS
Framed in various ways, the judges uniformly say that oral 
argument should not be a speech, but a conversation. Judge 
Kayatta’s view is that eighty-five percent of lawyers who appear 
before the First Circuit do not understand that the purpose of 
oral argument is to engage the court in, as he puts it, the same 
type of robust discussion one would have around a dinner table.
Chief Judge Howard advises that to the extent a lawyer can 
create the atmosphere of “just sitting in the office talking about 
these issues, . . . it’s a win.” He urges lawyers to force 
themselves into a conversational tone that will allow them to 
discover why the brief may not have convinced the court and 
address that flaw. Body language should communicate that the 
lawyer has anticipated the questions and not only is able to 
answer them, but is eager to do so.30
30. In addition to themselves communicating with body language, lawyers should be 
alert to the body language of the judges. Judge Coffin comments that “[a] keen observer at 
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Lawyers should answer questions from the bench 
immediately after they are asked. Too often, the judges agree, 
oral advocates say “I’ll get to that later.” When they do, the 
judges stop listening and become increasingly frustrated as they 
wait for the answer. A lawyer who refuses to respond to a 
question at all will have difficulty avoiding the inference that an 
answer would disadvantage the lawyer’s case. How to handle 
certain kinds of questions, however, can present a challenge.
A. Handling a Question That the Lawyer
Does Not Understand
The judges admitted that they occasionally ask long 
questions that may be difficult for the lawyer to understand. A
question may also have four or five component parts, which 
leaves the lawyer wondering what the focus of the question is. It
is dangerous for a lawyer to answer the wrong question. The 
judges were unanimous in saying that lawyers should not be 
embarrassed to acknowledge that they do not understand a 
question from the bench.
Although one way to handle this situation is by asking that 
the question be repeated, doing so may use up valuable 
argument time. It may also give the impression that the judge 
does not know how to ask a question or, as Chief Justice Saufley 
points out, produce a reframed question that is even longer and 
more incomprehensible than the original inquiry. If the lawyer 
thinks he or she understands the question, but is unsure, the 
lawyer could reframe the question in a way the lawyer does 
understand and say, “If I understand you correctly, here is my 
response.” If the reframing is inaccurate, the court will redirect 
the lawyer. This approach is also generally better than giving an 
answer that is not responsive at all because the retort from the 
bench likely will be “that’s not my question.” Chief Judge 
Howard suggests that reframing the question may be useful even 
if the lawyer does understand what was asked because it gives 
the judge credit for posing a complex or sophisticated question. 
Some judges, however, find this approach to be dangerous 
court would take note of the subtle signs of quickening interest—judges leaning forward, 
making notes, listening intently, perhaps even glancing at a colleague.” COFFIN, supra note
6, at 13.
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because it suggests a lack of attention. Even the judges who 
approve of it agree that it should not be used routinely, in an 
effort to twist the question into something the lawyer wants to 
answer, or as a means of dodging the question.
Occasionally, having responded to a judge, a lawyer will 
follow up by asking, “Does that answer your question?”
Although some judges think this inquiry signals the lawyer’s 
sincere effort to understand and respond to the judge, others 
think it is another waste of time. This, too, should never be a 
rote practice.
B. Handling a Question When the Lawyer
Does Not Know the Answer
Attempting to respond to a question when the lawyer does 
not know the answer is difficult and can be unpleasant if the 
advocate should know what to say. Nevertheless, the judges 
offered ways to handle this situation. If the question concerns an 
issue that in the lawyer’s judgment is insignificant, the lawyer 
can simply apologize for not knowing the answer, but explain 
why the matter is not important. If the question pertains to 
something that is significant, the judges said the best course is to 
ask permission to file a statement of supplemental authorities.31
What the judges agreed that a lawyer caught off guard 
should never do is bluff. Judges’ law clerks can research and 
expose a fudged answer, and judges themselves are likely to 
catch lawyers’ mistakes in the process of circulating and editing 
draft opinions. Faking an answer, citing cases for the wrong 
proposition, exaggerating the holding of a case, or misstating the 
facts affect a lawyer’s credibility. Especially in small 
jurisdictions, the judges know the regular appellate advocates.
As Chief Judge Lynn says, “you don’t forget if somebody gets 
caught with his pants down.” A lawyer’s dishonesty can also 
31. In the federal courts of appeals, filing of the statement is authorized by Rule 28. See
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (referring to the submission of a letter addressing supplemental 
citations that refers either to a specific page in the brief or to “a point argued orally”). 
Many state courts have analogous rules. See, e.g., Mass. R. App. P. 16(l) (providing that 
“[w]hen pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party . . . after oral 
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the court, by letter 
setting forth the citations”).
164 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
result in a published opinion with the lawyer’s name attached to 
it. Even if it embarrasses the lawyer to admit ignorance, Judge 
Lipez advises, “Do not dissemble. Do not fake. Do not make it 
up.” In Chief Judge Howard’s view, “there isn’t a better lesson 
you can learn than you have to be candid because there are some 
judges who are never going to forget. Unfortunately, I’m one of 
them.”
C. Correcting a Judge
As Chief Justice Suttell acknowledges, it can feel 
awkward—even presumptuous—for an advocate to point out 
that a judge labors under a misunderstanding. Nevertheless, all 
of the jurists agreed that when it is done politely, an advocate 
not only can correct a judge, but should do so. Allowed to stand, 
a mistake can steer oral argument in the wrong direction. It may 
be more difficult to correct a judge’s seeming confusion about 
the holding or import of an opinion, especially when the opinion 
was written by one of the jurists hearing oral argument. When it 
comes to misapprehensions about the record or the facts, 
however, the judges are generally grateful for a lawyer’s polite 
efforts at clarification. A lawyer can say, for example, “if I 
thought the record showed that, I would agree, but the record 
shows. . . .” A caveat is that lawyers should not begin to correct 
a judge by saying, “with all due respect.” According to Judge 
Thompson, although that preface takes the lawyer’s remarks 
“out of the spectrum of rudeness,” it may signal that the lawyer 
is “getting ready to punch you in the eye.” Judge Barron points 
out that the key to correcting a judge is to be confident and 
direct, but polite.
D. Handling a Judge Who Appears to Filibuster
In the matter of dealing with judges who will not allow 
advocates to make their case, the judges offered little comfort.
Judge Lipez summarized the consensus:
I think you’re really pretty defenseless in that situation.
. . . In many ways, it’s not really a fair fight between judges 
and the lawyer. Judges have all the advantage. I think you 
just have to suffer the indignity of hearing a judge going on 
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and on. After all, the only other option is to interrupt and 
say, “Listen, Judge, you’re not giving me a chance to make 
my case.” I think that would probably not be well received.
. . . [P]articularly if you’re talking about a visiting judge, 
the home judges may sense what’s going on and as long as 
it’s done politely, they would be sympathetic to that kind of 
response on the part of the advocate.
But he notes that “[i]f it’s one of our own judges who’s doing 
that, I think it makes it a little more difficult.”
Judge Barron comments that if the judge who prevents the 
lawyer from talking is on the right track, argument time is not 
being wasted because the judge is simply making the case for 
the lawyer. If the judge is not focusing on the right issue, 
however, and the lawyer is not given the chance to respond, 
Judge Barron recognizes that it can be quite frustrating, 
especially when the lawyer has a good answer. Filibustering by 
one judge can also be challenging for the other judges, who may 
have different perspectives they are prevented from exploring.
One option is for the lawyer to try to make eye contact with 
the other judges to encourage them to enter the fray. However, 
this strategy carries risks, for it may produce resentment on the 
part of the filibustering judge. An advocate can also try saying 
courteously, “If I could just respond . . .,” although there may 
not be any opportunity to say even that much. Chief Justice 
Saufley admits that a lawyer’s only option may be to endure the 
soliloquy, think up a quick, direct answer, and give it at the 
slightest opening.
Occasionally, other members of the bench may sense that 
one of their colleagues has commandeered the argument or has 
focused on the wrong issue. They may interject to suggest that 
the lawyer answer the dominating judge’s question or 
themselves redirect the argument. In Judge Selya’s view, 
waiting for another judge to come to the lawyer’s rescue is the 
best solution to filibustering. Presiding judges say they may 
acknowledge that the court has used up the lawyer’s time and 
give the lawyer an extra minute or two to reply.32
32. The practice in the Massachusetts SJC is to allow lawyers to continue to argue so 
long as there are questions from the bench. Before Chief Justice Gants’s time, this was not 
the case. As he describes it, after a question was posed, if an advocate “hesitated a moment, 
it was like Jeopardy. . . . It would be somebody else asking the question and the tendency 
became to need to interrupt because if you waited for the end of the answer, somebody else 
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If the court does not offer additional time, the lawyer can 
ask permission to finish a thought. Like other techniques, 
however, this one has drawbacks. Judge Lynch occasionally 
suspects that advocates ask permission to continue after the red 
light has come on simply because the client is in the courtroom 
and the lawyer feels compelled to put on a show.
E. When One Judge Appears Adverse
and the Others Remain Silent
A “hot bench” can sometimes consist of one judge who, 
although allowing the lawyer to argue, gives the appearance of 
being unpersuaded while the rest of the judges remain silent. It 
can be hard for an advocate to read the other judges in this 
situation because there may be many reasons they choose to 
participate or not.
Some judges may be more vocal than others simply 
because they know more about the case. In the Massachusetts 
SJC, for example, it is common for the “reciting judge” to ask 
more questions than others. A judge may assume control of the 
discussion in order to communicate with another judge, set up 
the argument of opposing counsel, or test the arguing advocate.
Judges are also aware that oral argument can be a rare 
opportunity for lawyers and some, like Judge Lipez, may be 
active simply in order to make the argument a meaningful 
experience. Judge Lipez realizes that it can be depressing for a 
lawyer to work hard preparing an argument, present it in front of 
colleagues, the client, or both, but meet with noticeable 
disinterest from the bench. As Justice Alexander points out, a 
vocal judge may also ask what seem to be damning questions 
even though that judge is actually inclined in the advocate’s 
favor. An elementary rule of appellate advocacy is that lawyers 
should never assume that a question is hostile. An especially 
active judge may simply enjoy playing the devil’s advocate.
Some judges tend by nature to be quieter at oral argument 
than others.33 Judge Stahl, for example, says he often prefers to 
would be asking a question and you wouldn’t get your question in. [The lawyer’s] time 
would be up and you’d have an unanswered question.”
33. Justice Thomas, for example, rarely asks questions during oral arguments in the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Laura Wagner, Clarence Thomas Asks 1st Question from 
APPELLATE JUDGES’ PREFERENCES AND PET PEEVES 167
concentrate on what the lawyers have to say. In especially active 
courts, it may be unnecessary for every judge to ask questions 
because someone else likely will do so. Silent judges also may 
or may not share the outspoken judge’s view. Eye contact may 
help the advocate sense whether quiet judges understand the 
issue. Even if the outspoken judge is off target, lawyers should 
never gamble that the silent judges will not make the same 
mistake. Judge Thompson advises lawyers never to give up on a 
judge or think that judges’ silence suggests their leanings. In 
Judge Coffin’s view, “a lawyer who is a gifted listener will have 
a sense as to whether he should concentrate his remaining fire 
on the difficult judge or on his more silent and possibly more 
open colleagues.”34
A final reason to persevere even when faced with resistance 
by one judge is that most appellate courts consist of an odd 
number of judges. Even if one jurist appears hostile—or, in 
larger courts, if more than one appears hostile—it is still 
possible for the advocate to win a majority. Regardless of how 
hard any single judge presses, an advocate should welcome 
difficult questions because absent an opportunity to address 
them, the advocate likely would lose. Judges expect lawyers to 
push back against aggressive questioning, and indeed say they 
respect lawyers who stand their ground, as long as it is done 
politely.
F. Reminding a Judge About Authorship of an Opinion
One subject of disagreement among the judges was whether 
an oral advocate should identify who was the author of a 
principal opinion. Judge Howard says this practice “makes my 
Supreme Court Bench in 10 Years, NPR.ORG (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/29/468576931/clarence-thomas-asks-1st-question-from-supreme
-court-bench-in-10-years. As Justice Breyer explains Justice Thomas’s view, it is this:
The point of a good question is
A. The judge doesn’t know the answer,
B. It’s likely to make a difference—or it could, and
C. The lawyer knows more about it.
That Justice Thomas believes the result is “the null set” may explain his characteristic 
silence at oral argument.
34. COFFIN, supra note 6, at 78.
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skin crawl” because it conjures up images of Eddie Haskell, the 
two-faced flatterer in the 1950’s television show Leave It to 
Beaver.”35 Some judges view the technique as distasteful, 
pandering, or even somewhat insulting because, as Judge Lynch 
points out, it suggests that the author has not prepared 
adequately for argument or does not know their own opinions.
According to Chief Justice Saufley, attaching excessive weight 
to authorship of an opinion also reflects a lack of understanding 
of how a collegial court operates. No matter who writes an 
opinion, it likely has benefitted from comment by the writing 
judge’s colleagues.
Other judges are not bothered by being reminded that they 
wrote a principal opinion so long as there is no appearance of 
apple-polishing. Occasionally, if it appears at argument that a 
judge is deviating from a position that judge has taken in a 
written opinion, it may even be helpful to point out who was its 
author. What is generally best, Chief Justice Gants suggests, is 
to focus not on authorship of an opinion, but instead on its 
reasoning.
G. Concessions
One purpose of oral argument is to identify which matters 
are contested and which are not. Concessions can help judges 
because they narrow the issues that must be decided. Some 
matters should be conceded without prompting because they are 
so easy to verify—whether there was an objection at trial, for 
example. Concessions about the policy implications of a 
position can be trickier. Although well-considered concessions 
can be a sign of the lawyer’s integrity, concessions not thought 
out in advance can be dangerous because the lawyer may not 
appreciate the consequences. Oral advocates should thus be 
reticent about making concessions at oral argument that they 
have not anticipated. Occasionally, however, lawyers refuse to 
35. A little background for readers too young to remember Eddie Haskell: His character 
was, as Wikipedia puts it, “an archetype for insincere sycophants.” Eddie Haskell,
WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 30, 2020 19:36 UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eddie_Haskell; see 
also, e.g., Leave It to Beaver: Eddie’s Girl (ABC television broadcast Oct. 9, 1958), 
available at https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4pvd47 (advance scrubber bar to 00:49  
to view the scene ending at 1:59 in which Ward Cleaver describes Eddie as “so polite, it’s
almost un-American”).
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concede points that are unnecessary to the result; they would 
win even with a concession. This can backfire. As Chief Justice 
Lynn notes, a lawyer who fights too hard over something that 
makes no difference may be in danger of suggesting that the 
case is not as strong as the lawyer would otherwise have the 
court believe.
One problem with concessions can be the lawyer’s 
relationship with the client. A lawyer may want to avoid saying 
anything during argument that will result in an opinion noting 
that the lawyer conceded a point. For that reason, some judges, 
including Judge Boudin, believe that that pressing a lawyer to 
concede can be embarrassing and so will not insist on a 
concession. Nevertheless, Judge Coffin explains that “[t]he 
discipline of preparation for oral argument should include a 
conscious inventory of facts, inferences, arguments, and issues 
which counsel can fairly concede without jeopardizing his 
client—and those which counsel should take the initiative in 
conceding.”36
IV. COUNSEL’S DEMEANOR, CONDUCT, AND MANNER
Although, as Chief Justice Gants emphasizes, form in oral 
argument should never be elevated over substance,37 some 
matters of form make a difference. Judge Coffin explains that, 
“[m]anner without substance will not do; but manner and 
substance will do better than substance alone.”38 He defines 
manner as “the composite of language, posture, pace, tone, 
facial expression, eye contact, gestures . . . all the ways in which 
an advocate’s thoughts and emotional intensities become 
conveyed to others.”39
36. COFFIN, supra note 6, at. 27 (emphasis in original).
37. Judge Lynch says that appellate advocacy “is not just a matter of how good you are 
at your own legal skills. Some cases you can’t win and you shouldn’t feel badly when you 
lose.”
38. COFFIN, supra note 6, at 37.
39. Id.
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A. Conduct at the Podium
Judges are accustomed to lawyers gesticulating vigorously 
or pacing around the podium because they are nervous.
Nevertheless, oral advocates should avoid wandering too far 
from the microphone because it distracts the judges from 
following the argument and may compromise the quality of any 
audio recording. Excessive athleticism can also give the 
impression that the lawyer is addressing a jury, not appellate 
judges, which was a common complaint. Any repetitive physical 
behavior—pointing pens, wagging fingers, pounding the 
podium—at a minimum is distracting and can come across as 
unduly aggressive. Judge Thompson encourages advocates to 
“leave the weapons at home.”
Judge Thompson also says that when a judge asks a 
question, the lawyer should look at the judge who asked it, not at 
the other members of the bench. To do otherwise suggests that 
the lawyer has not heard, does not understand, or is simply 
ignoring the interrogating judge.
Justice Breyer cautions against clock-watching during oral 
argument, which can be interpreted as discourteous. This is 
especially the case if it appears that the advocate is trying to will 
the argument to come to an end.
Chief Judge Howard advises that volume and tone must be 
controlled during oral argument. Although oral advocates should 
speak audibly, they should not shout. Neither should they raise 
their own decibel level to match that of opposing counsel, or 
even the judges.
Judge Kayatta reminds advocates to breathe. He views oral 
argument as not only a mental exercise, but a physical one as 
well. Lawyers can become so nervous that they stop breathing 
and speak so quickly that their anxiety is palpable. In a related 
vein, Chief Judge Howard urges lawyers to relax. He says, 
“We’re not ogres. . . . People are just way too stressed out about 
argument. . . . If you can just get to the point where we’re having 
this discussion . . . you’re going to fare so much better. And 
you’re going to enjoy it more.”
Certain words and phrases are over-used during oral 
argument, ineffective, annoying, or all three. According to Judge 
Selya, every appellate judge will agree that saying “‘I wasn’t 
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trial counsel’ sets his teeth on edge.” Judge Coffin interprets the 
phrase to suggest “Someone else made a botch of this. I haven’t 
got much to work with on appeal.”40 Filler words and phrases 
such as “er,” “um,” “you know,” “okay, “as I was saying,” and 
“let me repeat” should be eliminated from a lawyer’s 
vocabulary, as should phrases bearing a whiff of arrogance like
“as I said before” and “let me repeat.”41 As Chief Justice 
Saufley explains, argument time is short and should not be 
wasted with words that have no meaning. Judge Coffin wryly 
comments that phrases like “honestly,” “in all candor,” and 
“frankly” should be avoided because they “signify that most of 
the time the advocate speaks with forked tongue.”42 The phrase 
“I am court-appointed counsel” can undermine the lawyer’s 
credibility because it can often be translated to mean “I am just 
doing my job. I didn’t choose this client or case.”43
Judge Selya advises lawyers to adopt an argument style that 
is consistent with their skillset and personality. Although 
inexperienced lawyers can learn by watching veterans, they 
should not try to copy anyone. Chief Justice Wathen echoes that 
view:
You’ve got to be authentic. . . . You may not be the most 
polished person in the world but if you’re authentic, if it’s 
really you and you’re speaking from the heart, it’s going to 
come through. If you’re pretending that you’re somebody 
else, it isn’t ever going to come through.
B. Conduct at Counsel Table
The jurists all agreed that, when seated at counsel table 
either waiting to argue or having just argued, lawyers should 
give no visible reaction to anything. There should be no shaking 
of heads, grimacing, scowling, or rolling of eyes.44 Judge Lipez 
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 22.
42. Id. at 103.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Judge Coffin includes in this category of behavior to avoid:
The Violently Confirming Nod (after a judge asks his adversary a question) 
meaning “That’s precisely right, Your Honor. You’ve hit the nail right on the 
head.”
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explains that even when the judges’ focus is on the lawyer at the 
podium, opposing counsel is visible and signaling disapproval 
detracts from the lawyer’s professionalism and credibility.
Occasionally, opposing counsel will make an assertion of 
fact that is plainly wrong. Some judges, Chief Justice Gants 
among them, will tolerate a gentle shake of the head, especially 
on the part of a lawyer with a reputation for trustworthiness.
However, all of the judges discouraged facial expressions that 
demean opposing counsel. To quote Judge Barron, “the right 
face is a blank face.” When they are not arguing, lawyers should
behave like congregants in a house of worship: be still, silent, 
and attentive.
C. Demonstrative Aids
Demonstrative aids are seldom used in appellate courts and 
no judge encouraged them. Judge Coffin describes 
demonstrative aids as “devices suitable for a salesmen’s 
meeting, but seldom for an appellate argument.”45 Most judges 
find them not only ineffective, but a nuisance, especially 
because technology has made it possible for color copies of 
exhibits and audio and video recordings to be included in the 
record appendix.
Appellate courts generally have at least three members, and 
sometimes as many as nine, which makes visibility an issue 
almost no matter where a demonstrative aid is placed. Set in the 
middle, the aid cannot be seen by the public. Putting an exhibit 
at one end of the bench or the other means that the judges at the 
opposite end cannot see it. Often the print on demonstrative aids 
The Emphatic Shake (after a statement by his adversary at the lectern) meaning 
“Your Honors, that’s what he says but that isn’t the way it happened.
The Look of Scorn meaning “This lawyer is to be pitied; his client is such a 
contemptible liar.”
The Home Free Look (after an exchange between his adversary and a judge) 
meaning “Well done, Your Honor. You’ve certainly seen through his case.”
Seismic Shock (after a particularly telling argument of his adversary) meaning 
“Incredible that he could stoop so low.” This response can range from lifting one 
brow skeptically, lifting both brows, opening wide the mouth, lifting both hands 
palms up, to turning to the rear of the courtroom and waving a clenched fist for 
the benefit of his client.
Id. at 22–24.
45. Id. at 51.
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is so small that no judge can read it. The rare case in which a
demonstrative aid might be useful is a land dispute, where 
geography matters and a visual aid will help the court to 
understand the facts. In general, however, even when 
demonstrative aids are allowed by permission of the court, they 
should not be used.
D. Confidence
One of the qualities of oral advocacy that judges find most 
persuasive is confidence: the conviction that the lawyer truly 
understands the case, the record and the pertinent area of law.
Judge Coffin describes confidence as “a quality which, however 
manifested by counsel, if it stems from hard analysis, stands a 
good chance of spreading its benign influence to the court.”46
True confidence is often the product of experience. Although 
polish and professionalism probably should not play a role in 
oral advocacy, they do, and a lawyer’s confidence can help, 
especially, in Judge Kayatta’s view, in cases that are at the 
margins.
All of the judges distinguished between confidence that is 
the product of being well prepared, and bravado or swaggering.
Judges are put off by lawyers who suggest that they know the 
law better than the judges. As Judge Coffin explains, 
“[a]rrogance is bad, not because it is unmannerly, but because it 
tempts judges to be unjudicial. It stimulates a devilish—or is it 
merely human?—desire to rule against the party because of the 
lawyer’s communicated sense of superiority.”47 Chief Justice 
Wathen proves the point with a story about his predecessor, 
Chief Justice McKusick. During one oral argument in the Maine 
SJC, a lawyer from a large, out-of-state, big-city law firm began 
his argument by saying that he, like Justice McKusick, had been 
editor-in-chief of the Harvard Law Review. Otherwise 
unfailingly civil toward lawyers, Justice McKusick “pummeled 
him, climbed all over him . . . just bombarded this guy every 
chance he got.” As Justice Lowy summarizes, “it’s great to 
come into court like a colossus, but not like an arrogant twit.”
46. Id. at 35.
47. Id. at 21.
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At the other end of the spectrum is the lawyer who is too 
hesitant. Some judges find it difficult to evaluate a lawyer’s 
degree of conviction in their argument because good lawyers 
tend also to be good actors, or perhaps good poker players.
Other judges, however, can sense by a lawyer’s hang-dog 
appearance and apologetic tone that they have no confidence in 
their case and believe such behavior undermines the lawyer’s 
effectiveness. As Judge Lipez explains, “If you don’t believe in 
your case, how can you ever expect us to believe in your case?”
Some jurists are willing to excuse a lack of conviction on 
the part of a lawyer with little experience. Tentativeness that is 
the product of not being prepared, however, is dangerous. Out of 
a duty to their clients, some lawyers may need to make a point 
they know will not prevail. This is especially true of counsel for 
indigent criminal defendants. Chief Justice Saufley’s view is 
that good lawyers in this position will acknowledge to the court 
that they have an uphill battle, but will mount it as best they can.
Judges tend to appreciate pro bono or court-appointed counsel 
and will generally try to avoid embarrassing them.
E. Client in the Courtroom
Part of a lawyer’s job is retaining clients, and clients have a 
right to hear their lawyers present oral argument. Nevertheless, 
the judges advised lawyers to exercise extreme caution in this 
regard. A client’s presence may be problematic because the 
client may have a visible reaction to the presentation that 
confirms a weakness in the lawyer’s argument or may engage in 
disruptive histrionics. Judge Coffin explains that a client does 
not help the cause by “deep frowning, violent head shaking, 
mutual comforting, and even the frenetic sending of notes down 
to the counsel table.”48 The only benefit Justice Breyer sees to 
having the client present for argument is that it may help the 
parties to settle the case.
Many judges think an appellate advocate should never 
inform the court that the client is present at argument. To 
introduce the client amounts to treating the appellate court as if 
it were a jury and can be seen as in poor taste, especially if the 
48. Id. at 33.
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client is a victim in the litigation. Clients should never sit with 
their lawyer at counsel table. Neither, the judges agree, should 
the lawyer tailor an argument to satisfy the client. A lawyer’s 
job is not to please the client, but to win the case. Clients should 
be warned not to scoff, frown, smile, or engage in any conduct 
that gives the appearance of trying to lobby the judges from the 
gallery.
Some judges are able to tell who the client is by looking out 
at the spectators. Even when clients are emotionless, lawyers 
should be careful about appearances. Judge Lynch advises that 
the governor of a state who is a party to litigation should sit in 
the gallery, not in front of the bar. Well-known figures should 
avoid giving any sign of being entitled to preferential treatment.
As potentially problematic as the client in the courtroom 
can be the client’s supporters. Judge Selya tells a story from his 
own days as a practitioner when he represented a young woman 
who had been sued for workplace harassment. To then-advocate 
Selya’s dismay, the young woman’s mother appeared at oral 
argument dripping in diamonds and furs. Fearful of the judges’ 
reaction, but certain he could not persuade the mother to leave, 
Judge Selya settled on his best alternative: he seated the mother 
in the gallery behind opposing counsel.
F. Rebuttal
When it is allowed under court rules, appellants’ lawyers 
frequently ask permission to reserve a portion of their allotted 
time for rebuttal. Many judges, including Judge Lipez, 
recommend this practice because it gives the appellant the 
chance to have the last word. Other judges find rebuttal to be 
generally a waste of time because counsel—especially 
inexperienced counsel—tend to use rebuttal simply to 
regurgitate their opening arguments. For a time, the 
Massachusetts SJC experimented with allowing rebuttal, but 
abandoned the practice because so few lawyers used it wisely.
The best use of rebuttal the judges identified is as a pointed 
response to the appellee’s argument. It is the appellant’s 
opportunity to do what appellees are able to do: listen to the 
colloquy between the court and opposing counsel and emphasize 
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the most helpful points. Judge Lynch sees rebuttal as especially 
appropriate when there is a dispute about the record.
It can be an effective tactic for the appellant to reserve time 
for rebuttal but not use it. Just as an appellee’s counsel who 
finishes early communicates a sense of confidence in the 
outcome, the same is true of an appellant who relinquishes 
reserved rebuttal time.
G. Dress Code
One surprise in the interviews was certain judges’ reactions 
to how advocates dress for oral argument. Although informal 
dress may be expected of pro se litigants, one judge expressed 
dismay when remembering a lawyer who argued in a track suit.
In some courts, such as the Massachusetts SJC, incarcerated 
defendants whose cases are scheduled for argument appear by 
video conference and they necessarily wear prison uniforms. For 
better or worse for lawyers, however, clothes make a statement 
and for some judges, sloppy appearance can suggest sloppy 
work.
To the extent they expressed an opinion on the subject, 
most judges recommended dressing in a manner that is 
appropriate for any serious occasion.49 For men, a dark suit, 
white shirt, and red or blue tie is customary and always 
acceptable. Themselves women, Judge Lynch and Chief Justice
Saufley acknowledge that female lawyers’ attire can be more 
challenging. Chief Justice Saufley frequently advises groups of 
young lawyers that oral argument is not a fashion show, but a 
serious professional environment. She agrees with Judge Lynch 
that female lawyers should avoid mini-skirts, revealing fabrics, 
plunging necklines, or any other suggestive or flamboyant attire 
that draws attention away from the argument and toward the 
lawyer.
49. See also, e.g., GUIDE, supra note 25, at 3 (advising lawyers to wear “conservative 
business dress in traditional dark colors (e.g., navy blue or charcoal gray)” for oral 
argument in the Supreme Court).
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H. Humor
Most judges think there is some place for humor at oral 
argument, but lawyers should be cautious about efforts to be 
funny. Humor is often at someone else’s expense and can easily 
offend. As Judge Torruella points out, there is nothing humorous 
about what appellate courts do, and telling jokes can give the 
public the wrong impression that there is. Although a 
spontaneous, tasteful quip may be appropriate, lawyers should 
never plan comedy as part of their prepared remarks.50 Oral 
argument should not be funereal in tone, but when in doubt, 
humor should be avoided.
V. A FINAL WORD ABOUT CIVILITY
All of the judges expressed concern about civility.
Although few of them witness discourtesy in their appellate 
courtrooms, they often detect it in the trial record or 
occasionally in the briefs. To a person, the judges see no place 
or reason for name-calling, ad hominem attacks, or any other 
form of rudeness. They can tell from the record that the parties 
are tense and the litigation has been difficult. Denigrating 
another party or opposing counsel is never acceptable and 
according to Chief Justice Suttell, may even result in the 
imposition of sanctions. Chief Judge Howard is also put off by 
oral advocates’ efforts to disparage the trial judge by suggesting 
that a trial ruling was the result of chicanery, partiality, or 
incompetence.
Judge Thompson disapproves of even the seemingly lesser 
incivility of “snarkiness.” She acknowledges that “You can’t 
stop to have a street fight while court is in session,” but 
encourages counsel who has been attacked to respond, if at all, 
only briefly, and to “keep the hiss to yourself.” In general, a 
lawyer who is the subject of a personal affront should try to rise 
above it.
Some judges think that mannered conventions like referring 
to opposing counsel as “my brother” or “my sister” have become 
50. One judge mentioned an otherwise brilliant oral argument that collapsed when the 
lawyer told what was clearly a rehearsed scatological joke.
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antiquated and prefer “opposing counsel,” “counsel for the 
appellant,” or using the other lawyer’s name. Other judges see 
the reference to “my brother” or “my sister” as an effort to 
return to a bygone era of greater civility. Customs such as 
beginning an argument by saying, “may it please the court” may 
be unnecessary, but remain traditions.51 As a matter of deference 
to their colleagues, many judges begin opinions that disagree 
with the majority by using the established form: “I respectfully
dissent.” Judges tend to notice and appreciate lawyers who show 
each other respect by shaking hands at the end of an argument.52
This recurring theme—courtesy, politeness, respect, civility in 
general—may be the feature of effective oral advocacy that is 
most commonly overlooked.
51. According to Judge Coffin, this phrase is not intended to mean “May what I say 
tickle your fancies.” Instead, it is among those “expression[s] of respect” that are “not only 
genuine but also stem[] from one who respects himself.” COFFIN, supra note 6, at 102.
52. The judicial interviews on which this article was based all took place before 
COVID-19 appeared. Whether the handshake will survive the pandemic is uncertain as of 
this writing, but judges are certain to appreciate lawyers’ use of any gestures of civility and 
good will that may emerge to replace it.
